I think we needed to prove to ourselves that we could do it. Now we understand what elements of Saturn worked … and we can apply them to the rest of the organization. Saturn’s philosophy is that if people are honestly involved in decisions that affect them, they will do a better job. It’s very, very soft stuff. But that’s what wins and loses. Saturn has proven to the rest of the folks inside that it works.
You’re seeing it here in the last months. Take Jack’s management style, on his new strategy board for North American operations. It’s a face-to-face, give-and-take system of making decisions, instead of the old style, writing up a report and sending it to a whole series of committees. We have all the chiefs, of manufacturing, marketing, financial, purchasing-all the major disciplines-in on decisions from the word “go.” It’s amazing. When an issue comes up, bam! It’s scheduled for a meeting right now. And when it’s all over, it’s all over. There’s a decision made, and we all go! And the divisions compete against the outside, not each other. They all get in a room and think about what’s best for General Motors, instead of trying to make sure Chevrolet doesn’t get into Oldsmobile’s socks.
We’ve been severely criticized, inside and out, for taking five years to bring out new cars. Now we’re down to 30 months, 36 months. It’s the decision to get to the decision to do the new product-that’s where we’re going to be faster. Historically, in new-product development we may have had as much as 30 percent waste by changing the idea as we went along, when problems in manufacturing or marketing would crop up. You know, you start a car down this road, and then somebody wants to change a window shape or a hood shape. The goal now is to make that decision fast and make it once. [Also] in the past, we tried to increase market share at all costs. We were selling cars to rental fleets and making “deal of the month” offers, where we ended up putting no money in the cash register. No more. And the decision to change that strategy was made within five days … not five or six months.
The first thing that we’re doing is at the very highest level; we’re talking turkey with the UAW. No games-playing. Our facts are on the table; their facts are on the table. We have brought Inaki [purchasing chief J. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua] down to see Steve Yokich [UAW leader for GM]. Jack and Steve met, I think, the week after Jack got the president’s job last April.
Not really, no.
Ford may be the target; we may be the target. I don’t think it’s a slam-dunk that they’re going to go to Ford. Just one scenario would say that Yokich is certainly a leading contender for the leadership of the UAW, and as such, he would want to lead the negotiations.
The problem is not cash. The problem is … the North American operation. When we break into the black [here], this place becomes a pretty fine moneymaking machine.
We can generate cash to fund the pension fund and [speed up] new products. We could financial-engineer the devil out of this thing. That’s not going to solve it. We’ve got to fix profitability. And progress has been far faster than we expected.
