The 74-year-old ex-general wants the Labor party at his side in a large right-left government, the kind he presided over in the past two years. But Labor party chief Amram Mitzna, beaten soundly, prefers to remain in the opposition along with the stridently secular Shinui party. Sharon’s alternative is a narrow government with partners from among the far-right and religious parties, something he fears will alienate the United States, Israel’s most important ally. The left-leaning political scientist Shlomo Avineri, who once directed Israel’s Foreign Ministry in 1980s, says Israel would pay a heavy price internationally for a government that rules out any agreement with the Palestinians. Avineri spoke to Newsweek’s Dan Ephron. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: With these results, how hard will it be for Sharon to form a stable coalition?
Shlomo Avineri: It’s not going to be easy. One of the questions will be how a war in Iraq will impact the discourse in Israel and within the Labor party. Mitzna has cornered himself by saying he won’t join a coalition under Sharon. Maybe a war in Iraq will make things in Labor more flexible. It might allow Mitzna to make an about face–to say that under the circumstances, with the emergency underway, Labor must join the government. There will certainly be pressure on Mitzna from his own party to be in the coalition.
But if he refuses, how likely are some members of Labor to split from the party and take positions in Sharon’s government?
My guess is that it’s highly unlikely. Too much is at stake for everybody in terms of party structure, access to funds, membership and support. People who get a lot of support within the party would take with them a very small dowry if they leave. Labor stalwarts are very conservative, they’re not going to support defectors. So I guess there will be a lot of infighting and back-stabling but not a split.
Why was it wrong for Mitzna to rule out partnering with Sharon?
In an election campaign, you want to distinguish yourself from your rival, so there’s a point to saying he’s going to do things differently. But technically, it put him in a corner and I think this was a mistake. He could have said his tendency was not to join but that it depends.
What are Sharon’s other options?
The only other option is a right-wing coalition. I don’t think a coalition with [the secular] Shinui party is in the cards. Too many Likud voters would be offended by Shinui’s positions. But Sharon doesn’t want a right-wing coalition. He has been painting himself as a centrist and he doesn’t want to see the United States turn against his government. He’s afraid a far-right government would lose the free hand Washington has given Israel in dealing with the Palestinians.
In other words, Washington would be more inclined to pressure a right-wing government in Israel to make political concessions to the Palestinians?
I don’t’ think it’s a matter of pressure. It’s difficult to make Israel do what it doesn’t want it to do, but the United States can make it costly. It’s enough for Washington to just give Israel the cold shoulder.
Israel has asked the United States for $12 billion in extra aid in the form of grants and loan guarantees. How would the makeup of Sharon’s coalition affect Washington’s response?
I think money is a long term issue but it’s less of an immediate one. Sharon will first face pressure to accept the American road map [for Middle East peace]. I think a right-wing government, which will take an even harsher course with the Palestinians, will have to pay a higher price internationally. There is no quid pro quo. There’s nothing that Israel will gain from a more right-wing coalition.
Pollsters say Mitzna’s positions were popular but the candidate wasn’t. Why was that?
I don’t think most people are as left-leaning as Mitzna. People say they believe in the end there will be a Palestinian state and settlements will be dismantled but that doesn’t mean they fundamentally want these things, though a significant majority is willing to pay that price. I think he had one line that he could have pushed more strongly–disengagement [from the Palestinians] . He blurred his message by talking about negotiations first and got mixed up with whether he would talk to Arafat. The message became too hazy.
And how do you explain Shinui’s strong showing?
Shinui is really the wild card in this game. I think it suggests that a lot of people who don’t want to make up their mind on tough issues, like relations with the Palestinians, were given an escape clause by focusing on the smaller matters–mainly relations between religious and secular Jews. It’s also a reflection that Labor was not able to put its message across. I would say 70 to 80 percent of Shinui’s new voters are former Labor supporters. Shinui is a protest movement. People are fed up and there’s a lot of things to be fed up with if you’re enlightened, middle class and Ashkenazi.
What about the low voter turnout?
I think, again, the opposition is not suggesting a very clear cut alternative.
What’s the legacy of this election?
The legacy is very clear. This election results were again determined by Yasir Arafat. By turning down the offer for peace made by the left in Israel, Arafat persuaded most Israelis that there is no peace alternative. In doing so, he injured the moderate left in Israel for a very long time.
